Thoughts to work out...

Okay, Dr. T looked at my first draft of the proposal and had a big issue for me to address:

Will this primarily be a dissertation about rhetoric and/or identification (in which I employ autism discourse as a vehicle for exploration)?

Or, is my dissertation about the discourse about autism (in which I argue that a rhetorical examination will yield insights)?

I see how I'm sort of doing both at the moment but here's how I got to where I am currently:

When I first started researching about autism, as a new member of this discourse community, I scoured the Internet, watched movies, tuned into to television news programs. Kept hearing people ask about autism: "He's like Rainman?" Kept coming up against these symbolic representations of autism and Tobey that didn't really fit. He wasn't gifted at anything in particular, he was very verbal for an autistic child, but he certainly wasn't the "demon" child I've seen in movies, either.

I couldn't identify my son with any of the representations that I saw in movies or in television news programs.

So, I looked around on the Internet more and found online autism communities comprised of parents, siblings, teachers, and autistic individuals. There were discourse communities wrestling with who gets to "identify" themselves as autistic, who gets to "speak" for the autistic, how to reflect the beauty of our autistic children in light of the (overwhelmingly negative) representations of autistic individuals on television and in the media. The latter being a major objective of many blogs and online postings via youtube that I've noticed. This discourse community striving to identify themselves in light of these common representations.

Identification as means of agency (consubstantiality) to illicit change in society regarding the treatment and representation of autistic individuals. Identification as means of challenging these common symbolic representations: the autistic as "savant," as "a burden," as as "demon," as a "non-human," as "white, middle-class condition." Identification as way of coping with challenges that come with raising a child with mental/cognitive disabilities. Identification as way of coping with challenges that come with living with a mental/cognitive disability.

I suppose talking about both questions? Does that make sense? Can I do that?

I'm still wrestling, I suppose, with this...

Back to the land of the living...

I've finished Harry Potter and it's back to work tomorrow. Burke and Foucault and the 6 books from ILL that have come in...

And, finish the proposal...

The Birth of the Clinic--Chapter 3

"It must, therefore, have a world in which the gaze, free of all obstacle, is no longer subjected to the immediate law of truth: the gaze is not faithful to truth, nor subject to it, without asserting, at the same time, a supreme mastery: the gaze that sees is a gaze that dominates; and although it also knows how to subject itself, it dominates its masters" (BC 39).

"Disease is thus caught in a double system of observation: there is a gaze that does not distinguish it from, but re-absorbs it into, all the other social ills to be eliminated; and a gaze that isolates it, with a view to circumscribing its natural truth" (BC 43).

"disease is an individual accident that the family must respond to by ensuring that the victim has the necessary care" (BC 44). how true it seems our society believes that sentiment really is...

I'm thinking this passage relates well to the discussion on corporatization of autism: "Can medicine be a free profession that is protected by no corporate law, no prohibition of practice, no privilege of qualification? Can the medical consciousness of a nation be as spontaneous as its civic or moral consciousness? Doctors defend their corporate rights on the ground that they should be understood not in the sense of privilege but of collaboration. The medical body is to be distinguished from political bodies in that it does not seek to limit the liberty of others or to impose laws and obligations upon the citizens" (BC 46).

The Birth of the Clinic--Chapter 2

"The analysis of an epidemic does not involve the recognition of the general form of the disease, by placing it in the abstract space of nosology, but the rediscovery, beneath the general signs, of the particular process, which varies according to circumstances from one epidemic to another, and which weaves from the cause to the morbid form a web common to all the sick, but peculiar to this moment in time and space" (BC 24). This statement is increasingly interesting in light of Grinker's book on the "epidemic" of autism.

"Transmission from one individual to another is never the essence of an epidemic" (BC 24).

"Whether contagious or not, an epidemic has a sort of historical individuality, hence the need to employ a complex method of observation when dealing with it. Being a collective phenomenon, it requires a multiple gaze; a unique process, it must be described in terms of its special, accidental, unexpected qualities" (BC 25).

"A medicine of epidemics could exist only if supplemented by a police" (BC 26)-- i.e., an organization governing the behaviors of those "stricken" and those "in danger." "a political status for medicine and the constitution, at state level, of a medical consciousness whose constant task would be to provide information, supervision, and constraint, all of which 'relate as much to the police as to the field of medicine proper'" (BC 26).

"What defines the act of medical knowledge in its concrete form is not, therefore, the encounter between doctor and patient, nor is it the confrontation of a body of knowledge and a perception; it is the systematic intersection of two series of information, each homogeneous but alien to each other--two series that embrace an infinite set of separate events, but whose intersection reveals, in its isolable dependence, the individual fact. A sagittal figure of knowledge" (BC 30).

"the myth of a total disappearance of disease in an untroubled, dispassionate society restored to its original state of health. But we must not be misled by the manifest contradiction of the two themes: each of these oneiric figures expresses, as if in black and white, the same picture of medical experience. The two dreams are isomorphic: the first expressing in a very positive way the strict, militant, dogmatic medicalization of society, by way of a quasi-religious conversion, and the establishment of a therapeutic clergy; the second expressing the same medicalization, but in a triumphant, negative way, that is to say, the volatilization of disease in a corrected, organized, and ceaselessly supervised environment, in which medicine itself would finally disappear, together with its object and its raison d'etre" (BC 32).

This passage illustrates well the need for a Humanities-based approach to autism studies--1. Almost worship of empiricism and medicalization of disease that isn't beneficial. Doctors as deities who can do no wrong. But, empiricism doesn't exist in a vacuum. Medicine carried out by doctors who are influenced by society as much as they are influencing it. Humanities emphasis on how society is shaped by the way that we think about it--through language--needed to understand the individuals studied and to reiterate the "human" behind the science, both those studied and those studying. 2. This medicalization leads to the Positivistic approach to medicine and the body as something that should be perfected. The imperfect body that needs to be "fixed" or "cured."

"Are not doctors the priests of the body?" (BC 32).

The Birth of the Clinic--Chpt 1 Cont.

Back to Foucault... and since it's been a couple months since I read what I underlined throughout the book, I'm going to start at the end of the chapter because Foucault tends to reiterate what he's stated in the final paragraphs:

"Is a medical experience [...] not bound up with the very structure of society? Does it not involve, because of the special attention that it pays to the individual, a generalized vigilance that by extension applies to the group as a whole? [...] [M]edicine becomes a task for the nation" (BC 19).

"The natural locus of disease is the natural locus of life--the family: gentle, spontaneous care, expressive of love and a common desire for a cure, assists nature in its struggle against the illness, and allows the illness to attain its own truth. The hospital doctor sees only distorted, altered diseases, a whole teratology of the pathological; the family doctor 'soon acquires true experience based on the natural phenomena of all species of disease" (BC 17). This passage makes the case, in a roundabout way, for a Humanities-based approach to autism/ disability studies. Too much of the discourses about autism is medicalized with the focus on the distorted and pathological.

"The chain of one disease engendering another, and that of he perpetual impoverishment of poverty, is thus broken when one gives up trying to create for the sick a differentiated, distinct space, which results, in an ambiguous but clumsy way, in both the protection and the preservation of disease" (BC 19). Foucault is establishing in this section the "birth of the clinic" as a "space" that isolates disease but not to the patient's benefit. And, while Foucault is showing how medical care was slowly isolated to specific "clinics" and argues in this chapter for a more "home-based" integrated-into-society approach to medicine and long-term care, care that isn't isolated from society in institutions creating individuals who are alienated and dependent on the state (I think), his point seems valid in regard to discussions on the treatment and institutionalization of autistics. Not sure if this point will end up being used later, but I thought it was an interesting passage all the same.

Burke's "Mind, Body, and the Unconscious"

"If man is the symbol-using animal, some motives must derive from his animality, some from his symbolicity, and some from mixtures of the two."

"The fact that a machine can be made to function like a participant in a human dialogue does not require us to treat the two kinds of behavior as identical. And in one notable respect a conditioned animal would be a better model than a computer for the reductive interpretation of man, since it suffers the pains and pleasures of hunger and satiety, along with other manifest forms of distress and gratification, though it's weak in the ways of smiling and laughing" (64). I find this quote particularly useful since autistic savants are often describes as "computers" and the behaviors of some autistics are described as "mechanistic." Problems with those kinds of metaphors.

"In Freud's sense an action is 'symbolic' when, as interpreted in terms of his particular 'terministic screen,' it reveals the presence of a neurotic motive involving ' repressions' due to the particular kind of 'Unconscious' which he postulates as a locus of motives" (64).

Burke's "Terministic Screens"

I think, perhaps, why Burke might apply more appropriately to my dissertation is his discussion of "terministic screens" in Language as Symbolic Action. While Foucault's discussion on power relations in regard to disease and "madness" will be relevant to my discussions, Burke's "terministic screens" apply specifically--as David Blakesley as shown (and Dr. K would agree since he's also published in Blakesley's book)--to media and the ways in which media reflects and reinforces "reality."

Burke notes a distinction between "scientistic" and "dramatistic" approaches to language (44). "A 'scientistic' approach begins with questions of naming, or definition" (44). "Or, the power of language to define and describe may be viewed as derivative; and its essential function may be treated as attitudinal or hortatory: attitudinal as with expressions of complaint, fear, gratitude, and such; hortatory as with commands or requests, or, in general, an instrument developed through its use in the social processes of cooperation and competition" (44).

"dramatistic"--"stressing language as an aspect of 'action,' that is, as 'symbolic action'" (44).

"the 'scientistic' and the 'dramatistic' (language as definition, and language as act) are by not means mutually exclusive" (44).

"Definition itself is a symbolic act" (44). dramatistic view of language as "symbolic action" (45)

"Even if any given terminology is a reflection of reality, by its very nature as a terminology it must be a selection of reality; and to this extent it must function also as a deflection of reality" (45).

"'terministic screens' direct the attention" (45)

"Not only does the nature of our terms affect the nature of our observations, in the sense that the terms direct the attention to one field rather than another. Also, many of the 'observations' are but implications of the particular terminology in terms of which the observations are made. In brief, much that we take as observations about 'reality' may be but the spinning out of possibilities implicit in our particular choice of terms" (46).

"As Jeremy Bentham aptly pointed out, all terms for mental states, sociopolitical relationships, and the like are necessarily 'fictions,' in the sense that we must express such concepts by the use of terms borrowed from the realm of the physical" (46).

"'Reality' could not exist for us, were it not for our profound and inveterate involvement in symbol systems" (48).

"even something so 'objectively there' as behavior must be observed through one or another kind of terministic screen, that directions the attention in keeping with its nature" (49).

"Basically, there are two kinds of terms: terms that put things together, and terms that take things apart" (49).

"terministic screens positing differences of degree and those based on differences of kind" (50).

"We must use terministic screens, since we can't say anything without the use of terms; whatever terms we use, they necessarily constitute a corresponding kind of screen; and any such screen necessarily directs the attention to one field rather than another" (50).

"All terminologies must implicitly or explicitly embody choices between the principle of continuity and the principle of discontinuity" (50).

"It should be apparent how either situation sets up the conditions for its particular kind of scapegoat, as a device that unifies all those who share the same enemy" (51).

"all members of our species conceive of reality somewhat roundabout, through various media of symbolism. Any such medium will be, as you prefer, either a way of 'dividing' us from the 'immediate' [...]; or it can be viewed as a paradoxical way of 'uniting' us with things on a 'higher level of awareness'" (52).

"But are we not here 'necessarily' caught in our own net? Must we concede that a screen built on this basis is just one more screen; and that it can at best be permitted to take its place along with all the others?"

"I need but point out that, whether or not we are just things in motion, we think of one another [...] as persons. And the difference between a thing and a person is that the one merely moves whereas the other acts." I think this quote is important for those with intellectual/cognitive disabilities that seem to merely move rather than act because the "symbolic" is missing from the act. Again, response to Terri Schiavo illustrates this point.

"The human animal, as we know it, emerges into personality by first mastering whatever tribal speech happens to be its particular symbolic environment" (53).

From a Grammar of Motives: "A technique of analysis of language and thought as basically modes of action rather than a means of conveying information" (54).

Stigma of Intellectual Disabilities

I've been reading quite a bit from disability studies over the past couple months, and I was thinking about the lack of representation there is for intellectual/cognitive disabilities. Physical disabilities and mobility disabilities are covered. But, little is often covered in books on intellectual disabilities.

And, I think there's even a stigma and abandonment by the disability studies community in regard to the intellectually disabled. I said it. There. There is so much stigma against the physically disabled as being "inferior" and ignorant, that there is almost a shame--so little that wants to be said--about the intellectually disabled because it might reinforce or draw attention to those who represent the "reality" for some. Look at the program for the national Disability Studies conference in 2007--not ONE paper or presentation on autism. Not one. There was a entire panel at least at 4C's on autism in the classroom. But, at the national convention for disability studies--not a single one. I checked. And, in many of the books that I've read, there are chapters devoted to physical disabilities of various natures, but if there is a chapter on intellectual disabilities, it's just that a chapter.

I think disability studies are abandoning the intellectually disabled in a way. Here's why:

Linton mentions throughout her book, as do others, the necessity of the disabled to contribute to scholarship on disability. Couldn't agree more. Yes, the disabled need to have the opportunities to contribute about themselves.

But, like it or not, those without disabilities do not carry the ethos of those with disabilities to contribute scholarship on the issue. Ethos really belongs to the disabled.

However, if I (as a yet-not-disabled woman) do not contribute to this conversation, who will "speak" for Tobey? Who will "speak" for the nonverbal, intellectually disabled if not for the NT, non-disabled?

By limiting "who can speak and for whom" to just the disabled, the disability movement is ignoring a large group of people who can't speak up for themselves.

Burke's "Definition of Man"

I think this chapter from Burke's Language as Symbolic Action will prove very useful in my dissertation--

"Man is the symbol-using animal" (3). "'reality' has been built up for us through nothing but our symbol systems" (5).

"What is our 'reality' [...] but all this clutter of symbols about the past combined with whatever things we know mainly through maps, magazines, newspapers, and the like about the present?" (Burke 5). I think Burke's focus on terministic screens and the representation of reality fits well, more so than say Foucault, with my interests in media representations of autism as means of identifying autism.

"we like to forget the kind of relation that really prevails between the verbal and the nonverbal. In being a link between us and the nonverbal, words are by the same token a screen separating us from the nonverbal [...] since so much of the 'we' that is separated from the nonverbal by the verbal would not even exist were it not for the verbal" (Burke 5).

"Language referring to the realm of the nonverbal is necessarily talk about things in terms of what they are not--and in this sense we start out beset by a paradox. Such language is but a set of labels, signs for helping us find our way about" (Burke 5).

"'ideology' is imposed upon people" (Burke 6).

Humans are a "symbol-using, symbol-making, and symbol-misusing animal" (Burke 6). I'm wondering how Burke's distinction between "symbol-making" and rationalization plays into intellectual disabilities. I'm thinking of my Terri Schiavo paper and that she was considered less-than-human because she wasn't appearing to others to be using or making symbols. For autism, how much of the stigma against those with intellectual disabilities--even the struggle to accept and understand--is based on the fact that people believe that the autistic are not able to use or make symbols. Notice that Burke distinction between "man" and "animals" lies in the difference between being able to use and make symbols (man) and not (animal).

"symbolism" form of "substitution" (Burke 7). "substitution is a quite rational resource of symbolism" (Burke 7).

"symbolism"--"condensation," "displacement"

"cult of the scapegoat"--need to revisit this in earlier work for discussion in dissertation

Humans are the "inventor of the negative" (Burke 9).

"To look for negatives in nature would be [...] absurd" (Burke 9). "The negative is a function peculiar to symbol systems" (9). Negative is reflection of "unfulfilled expectations" (Burke 9). I underlined these passages when reading b/c I believe they fit well with discussions on disability. "Negative"--disability, "Positivism"--normal, well human with functions and abilities recognized and observable. Especially in regard to intellectual disabilities, conversations present those as "less than human," not the child that parents expected.

"the negative is but a principle, an idea, not a name for a thing" (Burke 10).

From Rhetoric of Religion--would tie in nicely with Suprahuman section: "Action involves character, which involves choice--and the form of choice attains its perfection in the distinction between Yes and No [...]. Though the concept of sheer motion is non-ethical, action implies the ethical, the human personality. Hence the obvious close connection between the ethical and negativity" (qtd in "Definition of Man" 11).

Humans: "Separated from his natural condition by instruments of his own making" (Burke 13).

"define man as the 'tool-using animal'" (Burke 13). "development of tools requires a kinds of attention not possible without symbolic means of conceptualization" (14). "Animals do not use words about words" (14).

"If we defined man first of all as the tool-using animal (or, old style, as homo faber rather than as homo sapiens), our definition would not be taking into account the 'priority' of its very own nature as a definition. Inasmuch as definition is a symbolic act, it must begin by explicitly recognizing its formal grounding in the principle of definition as an act. In choosing any definition at all, one implicitly represents man as the kind of animal that is capable of definition" (Burke 14).

"The instrumental value of language certainly accounts for much of its development, and this instrumental value of language may even have been responsible for the survival of language itself" (emphasis mine, Burke 15). I noted "instrumental" as "purposeful, pragmatic, and functional--a point relevant to autism and nonverbal autistics unable to use language pragmatically, purposefully. Or, at least some think that. I would argue that "nonverbal" is a loaded term--one that I would need to discuss in my dissertation. Because we assume that because someone is "nonverbal" that they aren't able to use symbols like NT's would. However, "nonverbal" means not speaking, but not nonsymbol using. Still, there's the assumption that thought is only able to be expressed verbally or with a formal language system. But, autistics use symbols to convey needs. This discussion on the semiotics of language is something that scholars of language and communication can contribute to the conversation. So much of autism-related discourses involve empirically-derived research; however, the Humanities can add to the discussion by examining the stigmas and associations made between symbols and those who use those symbols.

"Language is a species of action, symbolic action--and its nature is such that it can be used as a tool" (Burke 15).

Humans: "Goaded by the spirit of hierarchy" (Burke 15).

"The principle of perfection is central to the nature of language as motive. The mere desire to name something by its 'proper' name, or to speak a language in its distinctive ways is intrinsically 'perfectionist.' What is more 'perfectionist' in essence than the impulse, when one is in dire need of something, to so state this need that one in effect 'defines' the situation?" (Burke 16).

Aristotelian concept of "entelechy": "that each being aims at the perfection natural to its kind" (Burke 17).

"inasmuch as substitution is a prime resource of symbol systems, the conditions are set for catharsis by scapegoat (including the 'natural' invitation to 'project' upon the enemy any troublesome traits of our own that we would negate). And the unresolved problems of 'pride' that are intrinsic to privilege also bring the motive of hierarchy to bear here; for many kinds of guilt, resentment, and fear tend to cluster about the hierarchal psychosis, with its corresponding search for a sacrificial principle such as can become embodied in a political scapegoat" (Burke 19).

Revelations, Observations, Stuff to Read...

I've been working on the draft of my proposal over the past week and I've come across some points that are hard to "flesh" out. Namely, my rhetorical terms. I just kept coming back to "identification" and thinking that I need more rhetorical theory to base an entire dissertation on than just "identification." One of those things that you don't know what you need to read up on and study more until you try to start writing about it.

So, this week, I'm returning to the rhetorical "heavy hitters" Burke and Foucault for some rhetorical assistance.

And, what do you know, laying in the bathtub, I realized it's "consubstantiality" and "dramatism" were the terms that I was groping for last week in the dark.

Readings and bloggings for the week: A Rhetoric of Motives, Language as Symbolic Action, Madness and Civilization, and The Birth of the Clinic. I'll keep working on the proposal still, but I'm going to supplement that with readings from Burke and Foucault. I think I'll feel better when this week is over about where I'm going and what I've got.